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Abstract: The most important raw materials for bio-ethanol in Thailand are cassava, sugar cane and 
molasses. However, cassava has been promoted as a feed stock for ethanol due to the minimal inputs for 
planting, high productivity and all-year planting and harvesting. The most important factor influencing 
ethanol using cassava production is the price of cassava feedstock. Contract farming could decrease 
production costs, increase efficiency in markets, provide lower interest rates, decrease risk management 
and create symmetric information for cassava smallholders. The scope of this study includes cassava 
cultivation and factors influencing contract participation using logit analysis. Results from a survey 
consisting of 130 non-contractors and 127 contractors showed there was a verbal communication 
between farmers and agricultural cooperatives and written contractual agreement between agricultural 
cooperatives and processors. In addition, contract participation is significantly influenced by gender of 
household head, education of household members, number of agricultural groups, input costs, machinery 
costs, incomes and credit access. 
 
Keywords: Contract farming, Smallholders’ participation, Cassava production, Nakhon Ratchasrima 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since fossil fuel prices were very high in 2004, the Thai government modified programs and policies 
leading to increases in biofuels production and consumption. A plan for Thailand was developed covering 
bio-ethanol production from the raw materials and increasing the areas of bio-ethanol raw materials. 
Thus, the Thai government has promoted using E20 and E85 and has developed a price policy to make 
bio-ethanol  cheaper than regular gasoline (Bloyd, 2009). The most important raw materials for bio-
ethanol in Thailand are cassava, sugar cane and molasses. However, cassava has been promoted as a feed 
stock for bio-ethanol in Thailand due to the minimal inputs for planting, high productivity and all-year 
planting and harvesting (Zhang & Han, 2003; Sriroth and Piyachomkwan, 2008).  Consequently, in 2010, 
there were 24 registered ethanol plants in Thailand which produced 8.39 million litres per day 
(Preechajarn and Prasertsri 2010). There are three important factors influencing cassava production for 
bio-ethanol. First, the price of cassava feedstock which is the biggest cost in ethanol production (59.29%), 
followed by net operating cost (22.32%) and investment cost (18.43%) (Nguyen & Gheewala, 2008; 
Seumpakdee 2009; Bell & Silalertruksa, 2010; Suthamma and Chumnong 2011). Second, there are 
difficulties arising from cassava production such as the quality of raw materials (Nualvatna 2003), lack of 
labour (Office of Agricultural Economics 2007) and aphid infestation in cassava crops (Department of 
Export Promotion 2010). Finally, there are some agricultural marketing problems in Thailand (Nishimura 
2003;Nualvatna 2003). Therefore, choosing contract farming may be the best solution for cassava 
production because of contracting which may decrease the cassava production costs, reduce transaction 
cost in markets, lower interest rate, decrease risk management and symmetric information. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Contract farming has expanded to become a significant and expanding form of agricultural food industry 
in developed countries (Martinez and Reed 1996). For example, contract  farming accounted for 39% of 
the total value of US agricultural production in 2001, a substantial increase over the 31% estimated for 
1997 (Young and Hobbs 2002). Similar to in Germany, contract farming accounts for 38% of the 
production of dairy, poultry and moreover, contracts cover 75% and 23% of broiler production in Japan 
and South Korea, respectively (Young and Hobbs 2002). In addition, in Southeast and South Asia, contract 
farming has also increased rapidly in recent decades (Swinnen and Maertens 2007). For example, 
contract farming in Malaysia is also widespread, mainly based on state-promoted out-grower 
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arrangements (Morrison & Murray, 2006). In East Asia, contract farming is also widespread. For example, 
in China, the government has supported contract farming since 1990 with dramatic results: by 2001, over 
18 billion hectares were planted under contract-farming arrangements, an increase of around 40% from 
2000 (Guo and Jolly 2009). 
  
For farmers, contract farming has increased cash crop production, rural employment, social facilities and 
rural infrastructure (Glover 1990; Baumann 2000; Singh 2011) and has also led to better employment 
opportunities for women workers (Singh 2011). Furthermore, the main opportunity from contract 
farming is the promise of higher incomes. But, while important, this is not the sole criterion; for example, 
both Masakure and Henson (2005) and Guo and Jolly (2009) pointed out that stability and technical 
knowledge were the most important reasons why farmers join contract-farming initiatives. Contract 
farming can also provide many additional benefits and opportunities: it can increase on-farm 
diversification; technical assistance and knowledge transfer can spill over onto adjacent fields and into 
nearby villages; by-products from contract farming can be used for other farming activities; it can 
simplify marketing decisions, thus improving efficiency; it can stimulate the broader commercialization of 
smallholder farming; and, finally, contracts can be used as a form of collateral for credit. Additionally, 
contract farming also offers numerous opportunities for farmers including: 1) allowance access to a 
reliable market, 2) provide guaranteed and stable pricing structures, and 3) provide access to credit, 
inputs, production and marketing services (Prowse and Thirion, 2012).  
 
For firms, the opportunities provided by contract farming are clear and convincing (Prowse and Thirion 
2012), including: 1) increasing reliability in supply quantity and quality, 2) the off-loading of production 
risk on to farmers, 3) greater control over the production process and crop attributes to meet standards 
and credence factors, 4) reducing co-ordination costs, as a more regular and stable supply permits 
greater co-ordination with wider activities, and 5) economies of scale in procurement, via the provision 
and packaging of inputs.  Although Swinnen and Maertens (2007) posit that the higher transaction costs 
and investment constraints would tend to limit smallholder participation in contract farming, a clear 
rationale for contracting smallholders can be found in the literature on the relative merits of small versus 
large farm production in sub-Saharan Africa (Ellis and Biggs, 2002). Small farms are frequently the most 
efficient agricultural producers and have advantages over large farms in terms of labour-related 
transaction costs, in particular, supervision and motivation (Prowse and Thirion, 2012). In terms of 
poverty reduction, contracting with smallholders can reap large dividends: small farms are generally 
owned and operated by the poor, often using locally-hired labour and often spend income within nearby 
locales, creating multipliers (Hazell & Poulton, 2006).  
 
3. Methodology 
 
In this study, there are three steps to survey sample households. The first step is selection of sample 
region. The north-eastern region was the largest area for cassava planting followed by the eastern region 
and the central plain region. The next step is selection of province and districts. Nakhon Ratchasima 
province has been the largest areas of cassava planting in Thailand since 2006, accounting for 1.4161 
million rai1 in 2010 (Office of Agricultural Economics 2008; Office of Agricultural Economics 2011). Then, 
Dan Khuntod, Khon Buri and Soeng Sang will be selected as sample districts for the survey as they were 
the largest areas of cassava production and they had the largest number of cassava farmers (Department 
of Agriculture Extension 2011). The final stage was choice of sample households. 257 households were 
randomly selected. A total of 127 farmers under contracts and 130 farmers non-under contracts were 
interviewed. The standard econometric method for explaining discrete dependent variables such as yes 
or no is a binary choice model. Two basic techniques are used to estimate this model: 1) maximum 
likelihood methods (non-linear estimates) such as probit and logit model and 2) least square regression 
analysis (linear estimates) such as the linear probability model. With non-linear estimates, the most 
common frameworks used in econometric applications are probit and logit models. The probit model is 
based on the standard normal distribution while the logit model is based on the logistic distribution. 
However, for independent variables with very small values, the logistic distribution tends to give higher 
probabilities to their likelihood. Logit model is popular because the logit model is simpler compared to 
the probit model (Train 1995; Crown 1998; Fabra and Schmidheiny 2010) because the probit model 
requires the use of integral calculus to calculate the cumulative normal probabilities, whereas the logit 
model has a closed form that permits these probabilities to be calculated without integration. However, 
                                                          
1 A Thai unit of area, 1 rai equal to 1,600 square metres 
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both models are nonlinear, computationally burdensome and more complicated in comparison with the 
linear probability model (Crown 1998). In this regard, most applied economists find that in most 
applications, choices between two models are not likely to make much difference to results. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
Results from the calculation of key variables for human capital of 130 non-contractors and 127 
contractors are shown as Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Key Variables for Human Capital of Non-contractors 
 
Non-contractors Contractors Pr. 
Agronomic factors in cassava production    
Present variety of cassava (%)    
- KU 50 63.85 3.94  
- Rayong 5 2.31                      -  
- Khan-Daeng 1.54                      -  
- Rayong 80                            - 49.61  
- Houy Bong 60 32.31 46.46  
Planting period (months) 10.98 11.43 0.0017** 
Length of stakes (cm) 21.32 15.09 0.0000** 
Age of stakes (weeks) 3.12 3.98 0.0000** 
Chemical fertilizers (kg) 43.40 49.78 0.0950 ns 
Manures (kg) 236.55 113.25 0.0000** 
Herbicides (litres) 1.04 1.07 0.9236 ns 
Pesticides (litres) 1.28 0.98                
0.0282* 
Human capital    
Age of household head (years) 49.04 48.83 0.8756ns 
Average age of household member (years) 37.86 24.92 0.0000** 
Household head schooling year 6.43 7.26                 
0.0401* 
Household members schooling year 7.13 20.50 0.0000** 
Experience in growing cassava (years) 14.70 14.60 0.9242 ns 
Social capital    
Agricultural organization (groups) 0.83 2.29 0.0000** 
Years of participation 10.00 10.66 0.3402 ns 
Farm attributes    
Size of land (rai) 24.75 36.62 0.0220* 
Years of owner or management 16.95 16.35 0.6728 ns 
Assets value (baht) 330,808.70 703,898.80 0.0000** 
Source: Calculated from the survey 
      
Agronomic Factors in Cassava Production: Cassava is a tropical root crop which grows in a broad area 
of rainfall and produced by smallholder farmers (Howeler & Oates, 2000). It takes eight months under 
suitable climate conditions and grows best in direct sunlight within soil pH between 4.0 and 8.0 (Kuiper & 
Ekmekci, 2007). There are four steps of cassava planting (Nguyen & Gheewala, 2008): land preparation, 
planting, crop maintenance (weed control, fertilization) and harvesting includes loading. There are five 
most important varieties of cassava cultivation in Thailand (Senadee & Aksornneum, 2008); Rayong 60, 
Kasetsart 50, Rayong 5, Huay Bong 60 and Huay Bong 80. There was 63.85% of non-contractors growing 
“Kasetsart 50”, followed by “Houy Bong 60” and “Rayong 5” which accounted for 32.31% and 2.31%. The 
best planting period of cassava not only depends on the climate conditions at planting time; the best 
planting period also depends on marketing conditions at expected harvesting time. The cassava root price 
depends on the starch content, so cassava farmers want to maximize both starch content and yield at 
harvesting time. Moreover, cassava prices also rely on market conditions. Thus, farmers harvest their 
products in different months in order to get higher prices. 
 
Over 98% of contractors grew cassava by good technique with 15 cm length and 4 weeks stored to obtain 
a minimum of 80% germination (George & Mohankumar, 2000; Howeler 2007). Cassava is extremely 
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tolerant of acid soils. However, the nutrient content in the soil might be depleted; yields would be 
decreased if farmers grow cassava on the same land for many years unless farmers return the nutrients in 
the form of chemical fertilizers or manures. The non-contractors apply 15-15-152, 46-0-0 and 16-8-8 
chemical fertilizer with about 25 kg/rai. In contrast, contractors apply around 50 kg/rai. However, for 
manures, as a rough comparison, 50 kg of chemical fertilizer formulated 15-15-15 contains nearly the 
same amounts of N, P and K as 1,000 kg of wet pig manure (Howeler 2000). Contractors apply only 
chicken manure with 125 kg/rai. However, animal manures might be an important source of S, Ca, Mg and 
other micronutrients, but contain very low amounts of N, P and K and contribute to improving the 
physical condition of soil (Howeler 2000). Large amounts of manures were perhaps economical only if 
the manures were available locally; otherwise, application and transportation costs might be higher than 
the costs of chemical fertilizers.  
 
Human Capital: On average, age of household heads of non-contractors was 49.04 years slightly higher 
than contractors, which were 48.83 years. The responses show that the female household heads who of 
contractors was much higher than non-contractors, reflecting the fact that Thai women are more likely to 
go for further study in higher education (Office of Women's Affairs and Family Development 2007), 
especially in under contract farmers’ families. However, the mean of average years of education are highly 
significantly different with a significance level of 99%.  According to the Office of the National Economic 
and Social Development Board (2009), households whose heads were uneducated or had only primary 
education were found to be poorer than households whose heads had secondary education upwards. 
Thus, non-contractors who earned lower incomes compared to contractors poorer and their average of 
formal schooling years was lower. Further, in 2012, there were 305 agricultural groups and 38 
agricultural cooperatives in Nakhon Ratchasima province (Cooperative Promotion Department 2012). 
Moreover, there is Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), which as a state enterprise 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance extend credit more widely, directly to individual farmers 
as well as through farmer institutions and the National Village and Urban Community Fund, which is a 
learning centre fund and promotes the welfare of villages and communities. Household heads of 
contractors had belonged to agricultural organisations of 2.29 groups and 10.67 years of participation. 
The means of group numbers are highly significantly different with a significance level of 99% but years 
of participation are not significantly different. 
 
Cassava Incomes and Gross Margin: The data from the research area showed large significant 
differences between the contractors and non-contractors in production activities. The cost of one 
kilogram of cassava products of non-contractors was calculated to be 1.46 baht, while it was 1.11 baht for 
contractors. When the average selling price of cassava in one kilogram of non-contractors was 2.38 baht, 
0.92 baht of profit per kilo was made. The percentage of gross margin to the selling price was 52.99% in 
cash. In contrast, the percentage of gross margin to the selling price was 69.61% in cash. 
 
Table 2: Income of Non-contractors and Contractors 
Income Non-contractors Contractors 
Cassava income  (baht/rai) 9,860.41 12,230.83 
Gross margins (baht/rai) 5,171.98 8,505.78 
Off-farm incomes (baht/year) 79,947.69 50,834.65 
Tree crop incomes  (baht/year) 6,840.92 - 
Livestock incomes  (baht/year) 2,822.31 156.49 
Source: Calculated from the survey 
 
Determinants of contract participation 
 
 Female household heads have greater likelihood of participation in contract farming under 
cooperatives than male household heads. Women contractors of cassava in Thailand have a large farm 
size worked completely by local hired machinery and labourers. The husbands support the women in 
various ways in order to obtain influence in decisions regarding the cassava process. The women also 
grow cassava together with their husbands on their family farms and this cassava production is 
                                                          
2 The using fertilizer numbers with an NPK rating of 15-15-15, this fertilizer has 15% of each of Nitrogen, Phosphorus and 
Potassium.  
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completely controlled by both women and their husbands.  
 
 Number of agricultural groups was highly significant and positive which indicates that, if smallholders 
participate in one or more agricultural groups, the probability in contract farming under cooperatives 
will increase 21.15%. Studies by Kureh & Menkir (2006) indicate that in agricultural organizations are 
believed to be centre of information which can be accessed by households. Members and individuals 
are also motivated by other farmers to participate in beneficial groups such as contract farming under 
cooperatives. In addition, a number of agricultural groups to impart useful information to farmers could 
result in increased knowledge, productivity and income.  
 
Table 3: Determinants of Contract Participation 
Explanatory variables                   Logit model 
Coef. z 
1Gender of household head -2.5649*** -4.43 
Age of household head (years) 0.01187 ns 0.52 
Schooling year of household members  (baht) 0.3632** 2.43 
Asset value (baht) 0.000001 ns 1.40 
Cassava planting area (rai) 0.0059 ns 0.94 
Number of agricultural groups (groups) 2.1151*** 4.81 
Input costs (baht/rai) -0.0015** -2.28 
Labour expenses (baht.rai) -0.0018 ns -1.16 
Machinery costs (baht) 0.0022*** 4.21 
Cassava income (baht.rai) 0.0002*** 3.12 
2Credit access  -1.0529* -1.66 
Constant -9.8906*** -4.14 
Wald Chi2 = 66.49; Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 and Pseudo R2 = 0.7214 
1Gender and 2Credit is for discrete change of dummy variables from 0 and 1 
***: significant at the 99% level; **: significant at the 95% level; *: significant at the 90% level and ns: 
significant at less than 90% 
Source: Calculated from the survey 
 
 Machinery costs, including hiring tractors for land preparation, planting, harvesting and transportation, 
increases the probability of participation. 
 The increasing of a thousand baht in cassava income increases the probability in contract farming by 
20%. It can be noted that farmers get more than 0.05 baht per kilo of cassava production if they sell 
their products though agricultural cooperatives which are contracted to the firms. Thus, participating in 
contract farming under cooperatives can increase income and as such, richer households may be better 
disposed toward participating in contract farming. 
 The farmers who do not get credit from financial institutions have an opportunity to participate in 
contract farming more than the farmers who have access to credit. This indicates that contractors 
received credit in form of advance of capital inputs and services. Loans are usually given on the security 
of the anticipated value of the export crop or the land. Loan recoveries are usually made from as service 
charges or crop sales. Sometimes the farmers get loans separately from an existing a bank or credit 
agency, in which case the contract itself can serve as collateral. 
 The household members’ level of education was found to positively influence farmers’ likelihood to 
participate in contract participation. This means that farmers who complete higher education would 
find it easier to understand the information given when receiving advice from the extension agents. 
Moreover, technical assistance and knowledge transfer can spill over onto adjacent fields and into 
nearby villages. 
 Input costs including chemical fertilizer, herbicide, pesticide and manure for cassava production 
influence to participation. This indicates that lower production costs may make it more attractive for 
farmers to participate in contract farming under cooperatives. 
 
Discussion: The main focus of this study has been on the impact of contract participation on the living 
standards for smallholders. There was evidence that contract farming can be viewed as an alternative 
way to improve living standard. Contract farming can be used as an intermediate step in the transition 
from subsistence to modern production. However, government policy is one of the most important 
problems on cassava production for ethanol processing, as the price of ethanol can be more competitive 
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than gasoline; if the government supports ethanol, lower income smallholders may face difficulty in 
participating in contract farming. Therefore, if barriers to participation in contract farming for lower 
income smallholders are not reduced by making them more attractive to agribusiness firms then contract 
farming may only benefit wealthy smallholders. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There was a verbal agreement between farmers and agricultural cooperatives and a written contract 
agreement between agricultural cooperatives and processors. Thus, there was no written agreement 
between farmers and agricultural cooperatives. On the other hand, agricultural cooperatives would 
benefit 0.03 baht per kilogram of fresh cassava if farmers sell their products through co-operatives and 
farmers would get 0.05 baht per kilogram. Moreover, cassava represents a totally new market that will 
possibly increase significantly in the future as fuel reserves run out. Cassava farmers have a guaranteed 
market for their crops due to their products being part of a bio-fuel production chain. Seven variables, 
which significantly influence to cassava contract participation, are gender of household head, number of 
agricultural groups (groups), machinery costs (baht), cassava income (baht/rai), schooling year of 
household members (baht), input costs (baht/rai) and credit access. 
 
Recommendations: The main focus of this study has been on the impact of contract participation on the 
living standards for smallholders. There was evidence that contract farming can be viewed as an 
alternative way to improve living standard, particularly when underemployment on family farms occurs. 
Contract farming can be used as an intermediate step in the transition from subsistence to modern 
production. However, government policy is one of the most important problems on cassava production 
for ethanol processing, as the price of ethanol can be more competitive than gasoline; if the government 
supports ethanol, lower income smallholders may face difficulty in participating in contract farming due 
to the ownership of human capital and physical assets. Therefore, if barriers to participation in contract 
farming for lower income smallholders are not reduced by making them more attractive to agribusiness 
firms then contract farming may only benefit wealthy smallholders. 
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